Seventy Minerals Pacts, and Most of Them Are Non-Binding

The diplomatic push is hard to miss. Governments have signed more than 70 critical-minerals agreements and policy frameworks since 2021, with over 50 of those announced in the past 18 months alone, drawing in the major consuming powers (the United States, the European Union, Japan and Australia) in a coordinated race to secure supply and reduce dependence on China. As a map of intent, the network looks like progress toward diversification. As a set of contracts, it is thinner: a Plusmining review of agreements signed through May 2026, reported by MINING.COM, finds that more than 60% remain non-binding memorandums, partnerships or cooperation frameworks.

It matters because these instruments are supposed to underpin a multitrillion-dollar effort to dislodge a chokehold: China still controls an estimated 60% to 90% of global rare-earth refining and holds leading positions across several strategic midstream supply chains. A non-binding framework can create political visibility and improve coordination between capitals. It does not secure offtake or guarantee public financing.

The United States is the clearest illustration of the pattern. Washington has signed more than 20 critical-minerals agreements in the past 18 months and positioned itself as the most active player in the field, yet only a handful of those are legally binding. The arrangements that move investment decisions are the ones that embed operational or financial commitments: price floors, stockpiling mechanisms and co-financing. Broad declarations of intent do not clear an investment committee.

The more consequential shift may be happening on the other side of the table. Africa hosts more than 60% of global cobalt reserves and significant copper, graphite and rare-earth deposits, yet accounts for a small share of the agreements signed so far. Producer governments are growing more selective about terms. Binding deals so far cluster among a narrow set of strategic partners (Australia, Japan, Argentina, Ukraine and the DRC), while in Europe the Critical Raw Materials Act remains one of the few frameworks carrying legally enforceable diversification requirements.

Timing sharpens all of this. The urgency behind the diplomatic surge stems from US-China trade tension, and the scheduled expiry of the current US-China export-control truce later this year has become the focal point for policymakers and industry alike. Whether governments attach the pacts to binding commitments (offtake, finance, permitting, procurement) is what turns a communique into a refinery.

For the investment promotion officers Doyen serves, the operating lesson is to read the instrument. An MOU is a door-opener whose value is mostly as political cover for a conversation that still has to be commercialized.